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THERE WAS NOTHING “NEUTRAL” ABOUT
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066
Eric L. Muller*
There is no more appropriate place to discuss the Japanese
American cases of World War II1 than in the pages of the
Arkansas Law Review. This is not only because Arkansas was the
only state outside the Western Defense Command2 to host not one
but two of the War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) concentration
camps3 for Japanese Americans.4 It is because one of the most
important lawyers to oversee the development and administration
of all the WRA camps was the dean under whose leadership this
law review was founded: Robert A. Leflar.
Leflar’s is not a name that constitutional lawyers are likely
to remember in connection with the mass removal and detention
of Japanese Americans in World War II. That’s because he,

*

Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
I thank Professor Mark Killenbeck and the Arkansas Law Review for this opportunity to
respond to Professor Killenbeck’s article.
1. See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
2. The Western Defense Command was an Army-administered zone designated by the
War Department. It included Army troops and installations all along the West Coast of the
United States. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 201 (Gary Y.
Okihiro, ed., 2013).
3. The government’s euphemistic label for these sites was “relocation centers.” ALICE
YANG MURRAY, HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR REDRESS 69 (2008). The term “concentration camp” was in common
use while the facilities operated, however, and is the preferred term among Japanese
Americans and among scholars today. See Eric L. Muller, The Nazi Analogy in Japanese
American Civil Rights Discourse, 1 N.C. C.R. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
4. The states of Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming were each home to one. See
Greg Robinson, War Relocation Authority, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA, (May 6, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/F3FK-X6ZN].
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unlike a Charles Fahy5 or an Edward Ennis,6 had no role in
Korematsu v. United States,7 the notorious Supreme Court
decision that is the subject of Mark Killenbeck’s article Sober
Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered.8 But he played a
much bigger role than those men, supervising the day-to-day
work of the agency lawyers stationed at each of the camps from
1942 to 1944.9 It was Leflar and a few other lawyers at his level
who shaped the circumstances under which Japanese Americans
were confined and ultimately released.
Leflar’s role reminds us of the danger of what we might call
a Korematsu myopia in the constitutional vision of this tragic
chapter in the legal history of the United States. Because it is
Korematsu that generations of law students have read in their
first-year classes and generations of scholars have analyzed, the
Court’s opinion (along with its opinion in the Hirabayashi v.
United States case10 of a year earlier) can be mistaken for an
exhaustive account of the relevant history. But just as there were
crucial actors outside Korematsu’s scope, so were there crucial
facts.
This Korematsu myopia blurs the sharpest observations
Professor Killenbeck draws in his article, not only of Korematsu
but of its differences with the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in

5. Fahy was the Solicitor General of the United States who argued the Korematsu case
in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Charles Sheehan, Solicitor General Charles Fahy and
Honorable Defense of the Japanese-American Exclusion Cases, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 469,
469-70 (2014).
6. Ennis was Director of the Justice Department’s Alien Enemy Control unit. See id.
at 472. He is customarily celebrated for fighting—ultimately without success—against the
War Department’s efforts to secure President Roosevelt’s authorization to uproot American
citizens of Japanese ancestry and for urging Solicitor General Fahy to be more forthcoming
and honest in his factual presentations to the Supreme Court in Korematsu. See Eric L.
Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1348-49, 1374 (2010).
In truth, Ennis’s role in cases involving Japanese Americans in World War II was far more
ambiguous, and he himself was considerably less than fully forthcoming in the litigation he
himself managed. See id. at 1348-49, 1369-73, 1377.
7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
8. See generally Mark Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered,
74 ARK. L. REV. 151 (2021).
9. Leflar served as Regional Attorney and Assistant Solicitor in the War Relocation
Authority. See Edwin E. Ferguson and Robert A. Leflar, The Law of the War Relocation
Centers, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 564, 564 (1946); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ONE LIFE IN THE
LAW 58 (1985).
10. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Trump v. Hawaii11 upholding the Trump Administration’s socalled “travel ban.” In this brief response, I tell a fuller story
about the executive order that authorized the uprooting and
detention of Japanese Americans, one that reveals Korematsu and
Trump v. Hawaii as essentially identical where Professor
Killenbeck sees difference.
Many scholars see Trump v. Hawaii as a reenactment of the
Court’s key mistake in Korematsu,12 and it is not hard to see why.
In each case, the Supreme Court encountered government action
marred by bias against a disfavored minority group (Japanese
Americans in Korematsu, Muslims in Trump v. Hawaii) and
upheld it against constitutional challenge. This, it has long and
correctly been maintained, was a betrayal of the strict scrutiny
analysis the Court took pains to announce in Korematsu.13 Strict
scrutiny, when applied correctly, should have doomed mass
removal, and it should have doomed the travel ban as well.
Professor Killenbeck, however, sees a “stark and potentially
dispositive difference[]”14 between the two cases. Korematsu, as
he describes it, was a situation in which illegal and
unconstitutional bias corrupted the enforcement of a neutral
government order.15 The order, Executive Order 9066,16
conferred power on the military to remove a person of any race
from a military zone, but Lieutenant General John DeWitt
subsequently enforced the order with invidious bias, targeting
only Japanese Americans while leaving similarly situated
German Americans and Italian Americans alone. By contrast,
Trump v. Hawaii, as Professor Killenbeck sees it, was just the
11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
12. See generally Lorraine K. Bannai, Korematsu Overruled? Far From It: The
Supreme Court Reloads the Loaded Weapon, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 897 (2018); Jamal
Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J.F. 629 (2019); John Ip, The Travel Ban,
Judicial Deference, and the Legacy of Korematsu, 63 HOW. L.J. 153 (2020); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived
Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019).
13. See Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS Travel Ban Argument Post-Mortem and the
Surprising Relevance of Korematsu, TAKE CARE (Apr. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6Y8JNGXF].
14. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 153.
15. Killenbeck, supra note 8 at 169 (“Once in place, the scope and open-ended nature
of the Order gave great leeway to the individuals charged with its implementation. On the
West Coast, they transformed it into a weapon wielded almost exclusively against Japanese
citizens and aliens.”).
16. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
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opposite: a situation where Donald Trump, on the campaign trail,
invidiously fantasized about banning travel by only Muslims, but
then, once in office, implemented a ban that was religionneutral.17
For Professor Killenbeck, this distinction creates a crucial
doctrinal difference. As we know, illegal discrimination has two
elements—invidious purpose and disparate impact.18 In his view,
both were present in Korematsu: the original government order
was neutral, but a racially motivated enforcer saw to it that
Japanese Americans alone felt its impact. In Trump v. Hawaii, on
the other hand, Professor Killenbeck sees clear proof of only the
first element, in the form of Trump’s biased statements against
Muslims as a candidate. The second element appears to be
lacking because the enacted travel ban said nothing about
Muslims or adherents of any other faith.19 It articulated neutral
criteria for entry into the United States relating to security
conditions in the countries where the travel originated.20 Those
countries included a few where Muslims were not in the majority,
and the half dozen Muslim-majority countries reflected only a
small fraction of the world’s Muslim population.21 Professor
Killenbeck does not go so far as to argue that the travel ban was
categorically constitutional but says instead that its
constitutionality turned on details of its enforcement that were
unknown at the time of the litigation.22
Professor Killenbeck’s argument can be summarized more
simply: in Korematsu, first there was neutrality, but it was
replaced by invidious bias. In Trump v. Hawaii, first there was
invidious bias, but it was replaced by what appears to be
neutrality.23 That is why the Supreme Court didn’t repeat the
doctrinal error of Korematsu when it upheld the travel ban.
The problem with this argument is its grounding in an error
of historical fact. The story of the removal of Japanese Americans

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 207.
See id.
See id. at 203.
See id. at 220-21.
See id. at 222.
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from the West Coast did not begin with Executive Order 9066,
and it did not begin with racial neutrality.
The idea of removing people from areas along the West
Coast first came into the minds of military officials just three days
after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. On December 10, 1941,
a rumor began to circulate that some 20,000 people of Japanese
ancestry were planning an armed uprising in San Francisco to
support a Japanese coastal invasion.24 Convinced by it, the staff
of Lieutenant General John DeWitt at the Presidio developed a
plan to take all of them, aliens and citizens alike, into military
custody. The plan received tentative approval, only to be
scratched on the advice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.25
What is noteworthy is that even though the country was newly at
war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the plan envisioned the arrest
of people of Japanese ancestry only.26
Deliberations about removing people from the coastal zone
resumed in January, focusing on enemy aliens—nationals of the
countries with which the United States was at war, over whom
federal statutory law gave the federal government control.27 The
conversation at this point did not turn directly on race; there was
discussion about Germans and Italians as well as Japanese.28 But
a highly dubious proposal surfaced within the Navy to treat
American citizens of Japanese (but not German or Italian)
ancestry as enemy aliens, their United States citizenship
notwithstanding.29 And General DeWitt also reserved special
concern for Japanese aliens. According to notes of a conference
in January, DeWitt stated that while he lacked confidence that
enemy aliens generally were law-abiding or loyal, this was
“[p]articularly” true of “the Japanese,” as to whose loyalty he
“ha[d] no confidence . . . whatsoever.”30
In the middle of January 1942, Leland Ford, a member of the
U.S. House of Representatives from Santa Monica, California,
24. ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS 15
(1975).
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); 50 U.S.C. § 21.
28. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 15.
29. COMM’N ON WARTIME INTERNMENT AND RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED 63-64 (2003).
30. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting Dewitt).
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became the first political leader along the West Coast to press for
mass evictions of people posing supposed threats to security.31 In
a letter to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Ford proposed “[t]hat
all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland
concentration camps.”32 He said nothing about German or Italian
Americans.
Pressure mounted for action against people of Japanese
ancestry through the rest of the month. On January 29, 1942, a
Justice Department official agreed to the military’s proposal to
remove all people of Japanese ancestry, including United States
citizens, from Bainbridge Island, across the Puget Sound from
Seattle.33 That same day, General DeWitt reported on the
“tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against
the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and nonaliens, to get them
off the land,” because “[t]hey don’t trust the Japanese, none of
them.”34 Two days later DeWitt told a top aide that he wanted
“all Germans, all Italians who are enemy aliens and all Japanese
who are native-born or foreign-born” to be taken out of critical
areas.35
In early February, a battle opened in Washington between
the War Department and the Justice Department over the scope of
the President’s delegation to the military of authority to remove
people.36 The focal point of the disagreement was the treatment
of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. General DeWitt
insisted on the power to remove all people of Japanese ancestry,
including United States citizens; Justice Department officials
believed such action unnecessary.37 The wrangling continued
throughout the first ten days of the month. Eventually the War
Department, tired of the disagreement, went straight to President
Roosevelt, seeking his authorization “to move American citizens

31. Id. at 22.
32. ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II 25 (2001) (quoting
Congressman Ford).
33. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 31.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 33.
36. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note
29, at 72.
37. Id. at 72, 74-75.
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of Japanese ancestry as well as aliens” from “the entire West
Coast.”38
President Roosevelt dealt with the matter in a brief telephone
conversation with Secretary of War Henry Stimson on February
11. Neither man took notes of the call, but Assistant Secretary of
War John McCloy reached out to DeWitt’s office almost
immediately afterwards with the news that Roosevelt was willing
to give the Army “carte blanche to do what we want to,”
including the specific “authority to evacuate American citizens of
Japanese ancestry.”39
President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on
February 19, 1942.40 It is true, as Professor Killenbeck notes, that
the order did not mention race.41 Instead, it gave military officials
the authority to remove “any or all persons” from military zones
of their creation.42 Its language is neutral. But there can be no
doubt of what it embodied, or of the essence of the disagreement
it resolved between the War and Justice Departments. The order
gave the military the specific power it had sought to affect the
removal of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry—and only
of Japanese ancestry—from the West Coast.43
Over the following couple of months, General DeWitt
proceeded to issue proclamations designating terrain up and down
the coastal strip as military zones and ordering the removal of all
people of Japanese ancestry from them.44 His motivation for
doing this was transparently racist; he justified his actions on the
basis that the “Japanese race [was] an enemy race” whose
“strains” ran “undiluted” in the blood even of those born in the
United States.45 But he was not a biased enforcer corrupting a
neutral order. Rather, he was a loyal enforcer bringing a biased
project to fruition.
38. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 44.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 49.
41. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 167.
42. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 49-50.
43. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note
29, at 85, 93.
44. ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD
WAR II 53 (Rev. Ed. 1993).
45. ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN
DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 17 (2007) (quoting Dewitt) (emphasis omitted).

304

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:2

With this fuller account of how Japanese Americans came to
be uprooted for wartime detention, let us now return to Professor
Killenbeck’s effort to distinguish Korematsu from Trump v.
Hawaii. “In Korematsu,” Professor Killenbeck argues, “an
initially neutral presidential order was transformed”46 by the work
of “racist underlings”47 into “one targeting a specific group on the
basis of their ethnicity and national origin.”48 The situation in
Trump v. Hawaii, he maintains, was the reverse,49 noting that
“pre-proclamation statements that were permeated with express
bias eventually became a policy that was neutral on its face
. . . .”50
In reality, the situations are not the reverse of each other, but
the same. Japanese Americans were predefined as a security
threat in 1942; Muslims were predefined as a security threat in
2016.51 Neither General DeWitt nor President Roosevelt
entertained the idea of uprooting any American citizens en masse
other than those with Japanese parents, just as Donald Trump
never spoke of a “total and complete shutdown” on entry into the
United States for anyone but Muslims.52 Thus, it is difficult to
see “stark and potentially dispositive differences between … the
directives litigated in Korematsu and Trump [v. Hawaii,]”53 as
Professor Killenbeck does. They were both rotten with malign
motive, and it took no machinations by evil enforcers to see it.
I have argued elsewhere that there are meaningful legal
differences between the mass removal of Japanese Americans
from the West Coast in 1942 and Donald Trump’s 2017 travel
ban.54 There is no need to catalogue them in detail here; suffice
it to say that one can rationally distinguish the government’s
ability to push citizens around inside the country from its ability
to prevent noncitizens from entering the country.55 I therefore
46. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222.
47. Id. at 153.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 199
53. Id. at 153.
54. See Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 735, 744-45 (2020).
55. See id. at 746.
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agree with Professor Killenbeck’s claim that Trump v. Hawaii
cannot accurately be characterized as a reprise of Korematsu. The
point of this brief response is simply to note that what
distinguishes the presidential orders in the two cases is not that
Roosevelt’s was clean at conception and later corrupted, whereas
Donald Trump’s was corrupt at conception and later cleansed.
Both were dirty from the start.

